In this paper, we re-examine the recent evidence that technology shocks do not produce business cycle patterns in the data. We first extend Gali's (1999) work, which uses long-run restrictions to identify technology shocks, by examining whether the effects of the identified shocks are economically plausible. We do this in two ways. First, we derive implications from a long-run growth model and check them against the impulse responses of variables such as wages and consumption. Second, we test whether some standard "exogenous" variables predict the shock variables. We find that oil shocks, military build-ups, and Romer dates do not predict the shock labeled "technology." We then show how a standard DGE model can be modified to fit Gali's finding that a positive technology shock leads to lower labor input. Finally, we re-examine the properties of the other key shock to the system. This shock appears to correspond to a shock to the marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure.
I. Introduction
Standard real business cycle theory assigns a central role to technology shocks as the source of aggregate fluctuations. As King and Rebelo (1999) discuss in their article "Resuscitating Real Business Cycles," when persistent technology shocks are fed through a standard real business cycle model, the simulated economy displays patterns that look very much like actual business cycles. While the last decade has seen the addition of other types of shocks in these models, such as monetary policy and government spending, none has been shown to be a central impulse to business cycles.
A trio of recent papers has called into question the notion that technology shocks have anything to do with business cycles. Although they use very different methods, Gali (1999) , Shea (1998) and Basu, Kimball and Fernald (1999) all present the same result: positive technology shocks appear to lead to declines in labor input. 1 Gali identifies technology shocks using long-run restrictions in a structural VAR; Shea uses data on patents and R&D; and Basu, Kimball and Fernald identify technology shocks by estimating Hall-style regressions with proxies for utilization. In all cases, they find significant negative correlations of hours with the technology shock. 2 Gali's paper also studies the effects of the non-technology shocks, which he suggests might be interpreted as demand shocks. These shocks produce the typical business cycle comovement between output and hours. In response to a positive shock, both output and hours show a rise in the typical hump shaped pattern. Productivity also rises, but only temporarily.
We view the empirical results of these papers to be potential paradigm shifters. If these results prove to be robust, the idea of technology-driven business cycles loses all of its appeal. If it is "demand" shocks that are producing the classic business cycle patterns, then renewed emphasis should be devoted to understanding the imperfections in the economy that allow these shocks to have these types of effects.
In this paper, we re-examine the effects of shocks identified using long-run restrictions.
First, we provide evidence on the plausibility of Gali's identification scheme by studying the effects of identified shocks on other economic variables. The model is just identified, so there is no scope for testing any over-identifying restrictions. We overcome this problem by checking whether the effects of the shocks on other variables are economically plausible.
We then study whether a suitably altered real business cycle model can explain the facts.
We show that the kinds of models recently proposed to explain asset price characteristics can explain these effects of technology shocks, without resorting to assumptions about sticky prices.
Despite its ability to explain these effects, though, the modified model does not resuscitate technology shocks as the driving force of business cycles. In that sense, the original technologydriven real business cycle hypothesis does appear to be dead.
In the last part of the paper we study the broader implications of Gali's "demand shocks," which are identified as the shocks to labor that are uncorrelated with the technology shock.
According to Gali's work, these shocks are the ones that produce the standard business cycle comovements and match well with NBER business cycles. We examine the effects of these shocks on our broader list of variables, as well as their correlation with key exogenous variables.
II. Broader Effects of Identified Technology Shocks
A.
Effects of a Technology Shock in a Standard DGE Model
In order to determine whether the shocks can plausibly be interpreted as technology shocks, we examine their effects on other key variables for which economic theory has predictions. Thus, we begin by highlighting the predictions about how permanent technology shocks should affect other key variables in the economy of a standard DGE model. We employ a model that is a simple extension of the model presented in the working paper version of King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1987) .
Consider the following neoclassical model with permanent technology shocks:
The variables have the standard definitions: Y is output, A is an exogenous process for total factor productivity, K is capital, N is labor input, δ is the depreciation rate, I is investment, and C is consumption. We assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, and that v(N) is decreasing and quasi-convex in N. The representative consumer maximizes the expected present discounted value of utility, with discount factor β.
The key identifying restriction in the Gali analysis is that the technology shock has a unit root. We capture this feature in the model with the assumption:
where η is an i.i.d. shock. η corresponds to the shock that the structural VAR seeks to uncover. All of the terms involving functions of k t = K t /A t 1/α are, by construction, stationary. In this simple model, ln A t is the only source of stochastic trend, and it is common to all variables, except for labor input. Thus, a positive shock η to the ln A t equation should cause not only a permanent increase in labor productivity, but also a permanent increase in output, consumption, investment, real wages, and capital. One could easily complicate the model to allow for more stochastic trends, but as long as the additional shocks are uncorrelated with η, the same predictions about the qualitative effects of η should hold.
Thus, we have derived "economic ove r-identifying restrictions" that can be used to assess whether the shock identified by long-run restrictions is really a permanent shock to technology. In the next section, we will investigate whether the other variables react to the identified shock in the way predicted by the model.
B. Econometric Framework
We use an econometric framework similar to that of Gali's. In particular, we maintain the key identifying assumption that it is only technology shocks that can have permanent effects on productivity. Gali's basic framework consists of a bivariate model with labor productivity and labor input. Following his notation, we write the model as:
, where x t denotes the log of labor productivity, n t denotes the log of labor input, and ε z denotes the technology shock and ε m denotes the non-technology shock. We invoke the usual assumption that ε z and ε m are orthogonal. The assumption identifying the technology shocks implies that C 12 (1) = 0, which restricts the unit root in productivity to originate solely in the technology shock. Implicit in this specification, but not necessary for identification, is the assumption that the log of labor input has a unit root.
Gali also estimates a 5-variable model that augments these two variables with money (M2), the CPI, and the nominal interest rate on Treasury Bills. He imposes the further restrictions that shocks to these variables have no permanent effect on productivity.
We instead augment the system with real variables for which our DGE model yields predictions. In particular, we estimate the following system:
In equation (5) In order to impose the restriction that no shocks other than ε z have a permanent effect on productivity, we set C In order to compare our shock to the labor equation, ε n , to Gali's "demand" shock, ε m , we further impose the restrictions that C 2j (0) = 0 for j= 3, 4, 5, 6. This restriction essentially puts the labor input variable ahead of the other four variables in the ordering. Unless we impose further restrictions, we cannot interpret the shocks to the other equations.
In the baseline specification of the model, we assume that all variables have unit roots, an assumption not rejected by the data. We include four quarterly lags of each variable in the estimation, based on a BIC criterion. The Appendix shows that the results are robust to different lag lengths.
In practice, we estimate the model as suggested by Shapiro and Watson (1988) . In particular, we first estimate the following equation for productivity: As discussed by Shapiro and Watson (1988) , imposing the long-run restriction is equivalent to restricting the other variables to enter the productivity equation in double-differences. Because 
C. Data
We use quarterly data from 1947:1 to 2000:3 to estimate the model. For the series on labor productivity and labor input, we use the BLS series "Index of output per hour, business"
and "Index of hours in business," respectively. These series are somewhat different from those used by Gali, who used total employee hours in nonagricultural establishments for labor input and GDP divided by this labor input measure for productivity. His labor input measure includes only private employee hours, but his GDP measure includes government. Thus, a shift toward more government output would appear to raise productivity because it would raise the numerator and lower the denominator in the productivity measure. We believe our measures to be more accurate, although as we show below, we obtain the same basic results as Gali. The other series are chain-weighted 1996 dollar NIPA series from the BEA Web site.
D.

Effects of an Identified Technology Shock
In order to determine how the change in data and sample period (relative to Gali's work)
affect the results, we first re-estimate a Gali's simple bivariate model with productivity and labor input. The correlation of the identified technology shock with Gali's technology shock is 0.593.
Although this correlation is substantially below unity, the estimated impulse response functions are very similar. The correlation of our non-technology shock and Gali's non-technology shock is somewhat higher, at 0.852. The estimated impulse response functions for this case are also similar to those in Gali's work.
We now consider the results from our five-variable model. The estimated technology shock from this model has a correlation of 0.951 with the estimated shock from our bivariate model (and 0.550 with Gali's shock). The estimated shock to labor in the five variable model has a correlation of 0.929 with the shock from the bivariate model and 0.802 with Gali's shock.
In terms of the impulse response functions, we now consider the effect of the identified technology shock on the logs of productivity, labor input, and private output as in Gali's work.
(The log of output is simply the sum of the log of productivity and the log of labor input.)
Figures 1A -1C show the impulse response function for these variables. Consistent with Gali's results, the shock raises productivity and output permanently, and lowers hours, more so in the short-run. The drop in labor input in response to the productivity shock is at odds with the standard real business cycle model.
We now consider how the other key variables from a standard DGE model respond to the identified technology shock.
Real Wages
As outlined above, in the long-run real wages should move with labor productivity. In fact, one would expect the two series to have a common trend. Using an augmented EngleGranger test including a trend and two lags yields a test statistic of -3.589, with a p-value of 0.0807. Thus, one can marginally reject the null of non-cointegration between labor productivity and real compensation. The evidence provides some support for the notion that labor productivity and real wages have a common stochastic trend. Fleischman (2000) finds a similar result for a somewhat shorter sample period.
How, then, does real compensation respond to the technology shock identified with the long-run restrictions? Figure 1D shows that, like productivity, real wages rise immediately and appear to remain permanently higher after a technology shock. Thus, the behavior of real wages validates the interpretation of the shock as a true productivity shock.
For further confirmation, we also examined a bivariate system in which we substituted real wages for labor productivity. We imposed the analogous long-run identifying assumption, i.e. that only technology shocks can have a permanent effect on wages. Any labor supply shocks should have only a temporary effect on wages because capital accumulation will bring wages back to the balanced growth path. Consistent with the earlier results, the technology shock identified in this way also has a negative effect on labor input. The correlation between the technology shock identified in this manner with the shock identified in the bivariate system with productivity is 0.631.
Consumption
A permanent positive technology shock raises wealth and thus should raise consumption in the long-run. Basu, Kimball and Fernald show that their estimate of the technology shock leads to no change in consumption on impact, and then a slow rise. Here we investigate whether the technology shock identified with long-run restrictions has the same effect. Figure 1E shows that the response of consumption to the shock is consistent with the technology shock interpretation: Consumption jumps a small amount initially and then rises for a year to a permanently higher level. Figure 1F shows the impact of a positive identified technology shock on investment, defined as gross private investment, which includes nonresidential, residential and inventory investment. Investment responds erratically during the first two quarters, but then rises strongly.
Investment
The path displays a slight hump-shape, so that the intermediate effect on investment appears to be greater than the long-run effect. The level of investment appears to be permanently higher, though. This response is qualitatively in line with the model above.
To summarize, all of the results shown in this section serve to support the plausibility of interpreting the shock as a technology shock. In addition to raising productivity, the shock raises real wages, consumption, and investment. These responses are in line with those that we would expect. The only result at odds with the standard RBC model is the negative effect of the shock on labor input.
E. Can Other Variables Explain the Identified Technology Shock?
As argued by Hall (1988) and Evans (1992) Table 1 shows the estimates of three regressions of the identified technology shock on each of the three sets of dummy variables. In each case, we regress the technology shock on the current value as well as four lags of the dummy variable. We do not include lags of the technology shock in the regression since it is by construction not serially correlated.
As is evident from the p-values on the F-tests, none of the sets of dummy variables is significant in explaining the technology shock. There is no evidence that the technology shock identified using long-run restrictions is correlated with any of these other three shocks. 3 This result provides further support for the plausibility of the shock as a technology shock. The technology shock identified with these long-run restrictions appears to be a better candidate than the Solow residual for a true technology shock.
To recap, both the set of impulse response functions and the Granger-causality tests produce results that are consistent with the interpretation that the shock identified using Gali's method is indeed a technology shock. Real wages, consumption, and investment all behave as one would expect. Furthermore, the technology shock does not seem to be correlated with several other key exogenous shocks. These results make it even more imperative to understand the source of the decline in labor input.
III. The Effect of a Technology Shock in an RBC Model with Habit Persistence and
Investment Adjustment Costs Gali (1999) and Basu, Kimball and Fernald (1999) suggest that the negative correlation between the technology shock and labor input is evidence in favor of a sticky-price model. In a sticky-price model, a positive technology shock can lead to a decline in labor input if the monetary authority is not too accomodative. Stickiness of prices implies that aggregate demand cannot change immediately. Since demand does not increase, firms can meet demand with fewer workers since their productivity has increased.
In this section, we show that other types of sluggishness can produce the same sorts of effects. These types of sluggishness are due to real frictions, rather than nominal frictions. We will also show that the model is also more consistent with the behavior of real wages.
A. Model
How can a DGE model possibly be consistent with a negative effect of a technology shock on labor input in the short-run? As we will demonstrate shortly, it can be consistent with these results if the wealth effect of a technology shock outweighs the substitution effect on labor supply.
There are a variety of ways to modify preferences and/or technology so that the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect. We choose to use a model that has previously been used to explain some asset pricing anomalies. Jermann (1998) In sum, this model deviates from the standard RBC model in two ways: habit formation in preferences and adjustment costs on capital. Otherwise, the model is very standard.
B. Calibration
We We set a 1 and a 2 so that the balanced growth path is invariant to the value of θ. In particular, we 
C. Simulation Results
In order to compare the predictions of the model to the results from the data, we investigate the effect of a permanent, unanticipated jump in the technology variable A. We 4 Actually, both Jermann and Boldrin et al refer to an adjustment cost parameter ξ, which is equal to the inverse of our θ. They set ξ equal to 0.23, so we set θ= 1/0.23. The graphs show the responses out to 20 quarters. Not shown in the graphs is the fact that the labor supply rebounds in the intermediate-run, so that labor supply rises temporarily above the long-run level. In our baseline impulse response functions, labor input never rises above the long-run level. In some of our robustness checks, though, we find that labor rebounds significantly after a couple of years. In his five-variable specification, Gali finds that labor rises above its long-run level after six quarters. (See Figure 4 in his paper.) It is difficult to say anything definitive because the results are not very robust across specifications.
Why is the response of hours worked so different from the response in a standard RBC model? In the standard RBC model, the wealth effect has an immediate impact on consumption; the only reason consumption does not immediately jump to its new steady-state level is that real interest rates are temporarily high. In the modified model, habit persistence induces a sluggishness in the response of consumption. Consumers prefer not to change their consumption by too much. The natural alternative would be to put the extra resources into investment.
However, the high adjustment cost on investment makes investment a relatively expensive good in the short-run. Thus, the households "spend" the new wealth on the only remaining alternative:
leisure. Leisure has also become more expensive (because of the increased real wage), but with our calibration it is less expensive than investment.
To illustrate how important each modification is to obtaining the results, Figure Comparing results of the three models gives us a feel as to how the negative impact of a technology shock is generated.
Consider first the graph of consumption. The path of consumption is virtually identical in the baseline model and the habit-persistence-only model. In the model without habit persistence and only investment adjustment cost, the technology shock has a more immediate effect on consumption. Thus, the key to slowing down the consumption response is habit persistence.
Investment adjustment costs play the same role for investment. The investment response to a technology shock model is the same, whether there is habit persistence in consumption or not. Without adjustment cost on investment, though, investment rises immediately and displays a hump shaped pattern.
Therefore, it is clearly the combined sluggishness in investment (due to investment adjustment costs ) and consumption (due to habit persistence) that drives the decline in labor. Without both effects, labor either rises or declines very little. 6 The differences in the paths of real wages are caused by the differential labor supply response. Not surprisingly, real wages rise the most when labor supply falls the most.
Therefore, a modified DGE model can match the effects of a technology shock in the data. In particular, the model can explain the empirically observed drop in labor input after a technology shock. It does so with types of frictions that are fairly well supported in the literature, i.e. adjustment costs on investment and habit persistence in consumption. This model has the added advantage that it has been shown in other contexts (i.e. Jermann and Boldrin et al) to capture key asset market characteristics.
D. Sticky Price Explanations versus Adjustment Cost and Habit Persistence Explanations
As mentioned earlier, Gali (1999) and Basu, Kimball and Fernald (1999) suggest that the negative correlation between the technology shock and labor input is evidence in favor of a sticky-price model. Gali (1999) presents a stylized static model of sticky prices to illustrate how that class of models can produce a negative correlation between technology shocks and labor input. In Gali's version, in the face of a positive productivity shock but unchanged aggregate demand, firms need fewer workers to produce the same amount of output. Thus, labor demand falls.
The results also hold up in more complete dynamic models with sticky prices, but the mechanism changes somewhat. King and Wolman (1996) also obtain a negative effect of technology shocks on labor in the short-run when they introduce Calvo-type (1983) random price adjustment in a rational expectations optimizing model. They show that if the monetary authority targets the money supply, a positive technology shock causes labor input to drop. After a positive productivity shock, firms' markups rise, so there is a greater wedge between the marginal productivity of labor and the real wage. Because the wedge is expected to decrease over time, meaning wages are expected to rise in the future, individuals reduce their labor supply in the short-run due to the intertemporal substitution effect.
Both our model and the dynamic sticky price model predict a fall in hours in the shortrun. The mechanism by which this effect occurs is very different, though. In the dynamic sticky price model, hours fall because current wages are low relative to expected future wages. In our model, hours fall because leisure is the only variable that can respond significantly to the wealth effect of the technology shock in the short-run. The temporary decline in labor supply, coupled with the increase in productivity, leads wages to jump immediately.
Thus, the two types of models differ in a key way in their predictions for wages. In order to determine which model is a better characterization of the data, we can compare the models' predictions for the response of wages to the estimated impulse response functions. Recall that the impulse response functions from the data showed real wages jumping immediately with productivity. In our modified model, real wages jump so far on impact that they actually overshoot their long-run level slightly. In contrast, in the sticky price model (shown in King and Wolman's Figure 6F ) real wages do not adjust at all on impact, and then rise slowly to the new level. It is the gradual rise of wages that is the key to reduction in labor supply. The fact that the data do not display this feature casts doubt on how well this model can explain the decline in labor supply.
with b = 0.5 and θ = 2 generates a fall in hours for almost two years. The drop in hours on impact is 2.5 percent for a five percent positive technology shock.
On the other hand, the responses of the other variables are qualitatively similar across the models and the data. Figure 6 of King and Wolman (1996) 
IV. Non-Technology Shocks
In the last section, we showed that a DGE model can be modified to replicated the negative effect of technology shocks on labor input. This modification does not, however, resuscitate technology shocks as a source of business cycles.
Gali argues that it is the shock to the labor equation that produces results that look like business cycles. He shows that this shock, which he calls a "demand shock," leads to a rise in output and labor, as well as a temporary rise in productivity, which is consistent with the stylized facts of business cycles. He shows that most of the business cycle movements in output and labor over the post-war are attributable to the demand shock rather than the technology shock.
Since this shock is potentially "the business cycle shock," it is important to understand its properties as well. To shed more light on the nature of this shock, we analyze it in the same manner that we analyzed the technology shock in Section II.
Gali identifies the demand shock in a bivariate model as the shock to the labor equation that is uncorrelated with the technology shock. In our model, we also use the shock to the labor equation. Since ours is a five-variable model, we must impose a Choleski decomposition so that hours are ordered before consumption and investment. The correlation between our labor equation shock identified this way and Gali's demand shock is 0.8. Figure 4 shows the impulse response to a labor equation shock. The responses of productivity, output and hours are very similar to those from Gali's work. In particular, productivity rises temporarily for a year, and output and hours rise with a hump-shaped pattern.
The new variables added in our system are real wages, consumption, and investment.
Investment and consumption rise, along with output and hours. Real wages fall, however, in response to the labor shock. Furthermore, the fall appears to be quite persistent.
What kind of shock would lead to this pattern of responses? The patterns in the data implicate one particular type of shock: a shock to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. The rise in output, hours, consumption and investment in the face of declining wages is consistent with a shock that decreases the marginal utility of leisure. The labor supply curve shifts out, real wages fall, and firms invest more. The temporary blip in productivity could be accounted for by a rise in effort or capital utilization.
This interpretation is consistent with the conclusions of Shapiro and Watson (1988) , although they identify their shocks using a different type of long-run restriction. Their key identifying restriction is that the level of output is determined in the long-run by supply shocks, such as shocks to technology and labor supply. This assumption is at odds with current knowledge about the effects of government spending. Nevertheless, in a model with output, hours, inflation and the real interest rate, they find that permanent shocks to labor supply are a major source of business cycles, accounting for 40 percent of the 8 quarter ahead variability in output. They do not include real wages in their model.
In his discussion of Shapiro and Watson, Hall (1988) expressed extreme skepticism about this conclusion. Ironically, nine years later Hall (1997) uncoverd a very similar result. He decomposed the driving forces of business cycles based on a distinction between atemporal and intertemporal effects of shocks. These results led him to conclude: "the prime driving force in fluctuations turns out to be shifts in the marginal rate of substitution between goods and work."
Our findings lend further support to this conclusion.
It is interesting to see whether the labor shock is correlated with any of the exogenous dummy variables discussed previously for the technology shock. Thus, we estimate the same sorts of regressions, this time with the labor equation shock rather than the technology shock as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 2 .
Recall that none of the variables was correlated with the technology shock. We obtain very different results for the labor shock. We can overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that the 
V. Conclusions
When we initially set out on this project, we thought that we would be able to show that the shocks identified using long-run restrictions could not plausibly be interpreted as technology shocks. We were surprised to find that further study of the data supported that interpretation.
Indeed, what appears to have all of the right properties for a technology shock leads to very unbusiness cycle like characteristics. Hours move in the opposite direction of output, productivity, consumption and investment.
Faced with these strong facts, we then investigated whether other modeling devices besides sticky prices could produce these effects. We found that the combination of habit persistence and adjustment costs on investment closely replicate the responses found in the data.
Furthermore, the predictions of this modified model for real wages are more consistent with the data than the sticky price model.
Finally, we studied the characteristics of the other key shock in the system, the one that produces positive comovements between output, productivity and hours. We found that this shock also raises consumption and investment, but it drives down real wages. Over 20 percent of the variation in this shock can be explained by simple dummy variables capturing oil events and military events. The F-test is based on a regression of the identified labor shock on a constant and current and four quarterly lags of the variable in question. (Lagged values of the labor shock are not included because the labor shock is by construction serially uncorrelated.) The F-test corresponds to the test that all of the coefficients on the dummy variable in question are jointly equal to zero. E. F.
